Intranasal SARS-CoV-2 RBD decorated nanoparticle vaccine enhances viral clearance in the Syrian hamster model.

Multiple vaccines have been developed and licensed for severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus-2 (SARS-CoV-2). While these vaccines reduce disease severity, they do not prevent infection. To prevent infection and limit transmission, vaccines must be developed that induce immunity in the respiratory tract. Therefore, we performed proof-of-principle studies with an intranasal nanoparticle vaccine against SARS-CoV-2. The vaccine candidate consisted of the self-assembling 60-subunit I3-01 protein scaffold covalently decorated with the SARS-CoV-2 receptor-binding domain (RBD) using the SpyCatcher-SpyTag system. We verified the intended antigen display features by reconstructing the I3-01 scaffold to 3.4 A using cryogenicelectron microscopy. Using this RBD-grafted SpyCage scaffold (RBD + SpyCage), we performed two intranasal vaccination studies in the "gold-standard" pre-clinical Syrian hamster model. The initial study focused on assessing the immunogenicity of RBD + SpyCage combined with the LTA1 intranasal adjuvant. These studies showed RBD + SpyCage vaccination induced an antibody response that promoted viral clearance but did not prevent infection. Inclusion of the LTA1 adjuvant enhanced the magnitude of the antibody response but did not enhance protection. Thus, in an expanded study, in the absence of an intranasal adjuvant, we evaluated if covalent bonding of RBD to the scaffold was required to induce an antibody response. Covalent grafting of RBD was required for the vaccine to be immunogenic, and animals vaccinated with RBD + SpyCage more rapidly cleared SARS-CoV-2 from both the upper and lower respiratory tract. These findings demonstrate the intranasal SpyCage vaccine platform can induce protection against SARS-CoV-2 and, with additional modifications to improve immunogenicity, is a versatile platform for the development of intranasal vaccines targeting respiratory pathogens.IMPORTANCEDespite the availability of efficacious COVID vaccines that reduce disease severity, SARS-CoV-2 continues to spread. To limit SARS-CoV-2 transmission, the next generation of vaccines must induce immunity in the mucosa of the upper respiratory tract. Therefore, we performed proof-of-principle, intranasal vaccination studies with a recombinant protein nanoparticle scaffold, SpyCage, decorated with the RBD of the S protein (SpyCage + RBD). We show that SpyCage + RBD was immunogenic and enhanced SARS-CoV-2 clearance from the nose and lungs of Syrian hamsters. Moreover, covalent grafting of the RBD to the scaffold was required to induce an immune response when given via the intranasal route. These proof-of-concept findings indicate that with further enhancements to immunogenicity (e.g., adjuvant incorporation and antigen optimization), the SpyCage scaffold has potential as a versatile, intranasal vaccine platform for respiratory pathogens.

Transmission of Human Influenza A Virus in Pigs Selects for Adaptive Mutations on the HA Gene.

Influenza A viruses (FLUAV) cause respiratory diseases in many host species, including humans and pigs. The spillover of FLUAV between swine and humans has been a concern for both public health and the swine industry. With the emergence of the triple reassortant internal gene (TRIG) constellation, establishment of human-origin FLUAVs in pigs has become more common, leading to increased viral diversity. However, little is known about the adaptation processes that are needed for a human-origin FLUAV to transmit and become established in pigs. We generated a reassortant FLUAV (VIC11pTRIG) containing surface gene segments from a human FLUAV strain and internal gene segments from the 2009 pandemic and TRIG FLUAV lineages and demonstrated that it can replicate and transmit in pigs. Sequencing and variant analysis identified three mutants that emerged during replication in pigs, which were mapped near the receptor binding site of the hemagglutinin (HA). The variants replicated more efficiently in differentiated swine tracheal cells compared to the virus containing the wildtype human-origin HA, and one of them was present in all contact pigs. These results show that variants are selected quickly after replication of human-origin HA in pigs, leading to improved fitness in the swine host, likely contributing to transmission. IMPORTANCE Influenza A viruses cause respiratory disease in several species, including humans and pigs. The bidirectional transmission of FLUAV between humans and pigs plays a significant role in the generation of novel viral strains, greatly impacting viral epidemiology. However, little is known about the evolutionary processes that allow human FLUAV to become established in pigs. In this study, we generated reassortant viruses containing human seasonal HA and neuraminidase (NA) on different constellations of internal genes and tested their ability to replicate and transmit in pigs. We demonstrated that a virus containing a common internal gene constellation currently found in U.S. swine was able to transmit efficiently via the respiratory route. We identified a specific amino acid substitution that was fixed in the respiratory contact pigs that was associated with improved replication in primary swine tracheal epithelial cells, suggesting it was crucial for the transmissibility of the human virus in pigs.

Sequential Transmission of Influenza Viruses in Ferrets Does Not Enhance Infectivity and Does Not Predict Transmissibility in Humans.

Airborne transmission in ferrets is a key component of pandemic risk assessment. However, some emerging avian influenza viruses transmit between ferrets but do not spread in humans. Therefore, we evaluated sequential rounds of airborne transmission as an approach to enhance the predictive accuracy of the ferret model. We reasoned that infection of ferrets via the respiratory route and onward transmission would more closely model transmission in humans. We hypothesized that pandemic and seasonal viruses would transmit efficiently over two rounds of transmission, while emerging avian viruses would fail to transmit in a second round. The 2009 pandemic H1N1 (pdm09) and seasonal H3N2 viruses were compared to avian-origin H7N9 and H3N8 viruses. Depending on the virus strain, transmission efficiency varied from 50 to 100% during the first round of transmission; the efficiency for each virus did not change during the second round, and viral replication kinetics in both rounds of transmission were similar. Both the H1N1pdm09 and H7N9 viruses acquired specific mutations during sequential transmission, while the H3N2 and H3N8 viruses did not; however, a global analysis of host-adaptive mutations revealed that minimal changes were associated with transmission of H1N1 and H3N2 viruses, while a greater number of changes occurred in the avian H3N8 and H7N9 viruses. Thus, influenza viruses that transmit in ferrets maintain their transmission efficiency through serial rounds of transmission. This answers the question of whether ferrets can propagate viruses through more than one round of airborne transmission and emphasizes that transmission in ferrets is necessary but not sufficient to infer transmissibility in humans. IMPORTANCE Airborne transmission in ferrets is used to gauge the pandemic potential of emerging influenza viruses; however, some emerging influenza viruses that transmit between ferrets do not spread between humans. Therefore, we evaluated sequential rounds of airborne transmission in ferrets as a strategy to enhance the predictive accuracy of the ferret model. Human influenza viruses transmitted efficiently (>83%) over two rounds of airborne transmission, demonstrating that, like humans, ferrets infected by the respiratory route can propagate the infection onward through the air. However, emerging avian influenza viruses with associated host-adaptive mutations also transmitted through sequential transmission. Thus, airborne transmission in ferrets is necessary but not sufficient to infer transmissibility in humans, and sequential transmission did not enhance pandemic risk assessment.

Changes in the Hemagglutinin and Internal Gene Segments Were Needed for Human Seasonal H3 Influenza A Virus to Efficiently Infect and Replicate in Swine.

The current diversity of influenza A viruses (IAV) circulating in swine is largely a consequence of human-to-swine transmission events and consequent evolution in pigs. However, little is known about the requirements for human IAVs to transmit to and subsequently adapt in pigs. Novel human-like H3 viruses were detected in swine herds in the U.S. in 2012 and have continued to circulate and evolve in swine. We evaluated the contributions of gene segments on the ability of these viruses to infect pigs by using a series of in vitro models. For this purpose, reassortant viruses were generated by reverse genetics (rg) swapping the surface genes (hemagglutinin-HA and neuraminidase-NA) and internal gene segment backbones between a human-like H3N1 isolated from swine and a seasonal human H3N2 virus with common HA ancestry. Virus growth kinetics in porcine intestinal epithelial cells (SD-PJEC) and in ex-vivo porcine trachea explants were significantly reduced by replacing the swine-adapted HA with the human seasonal HA. Unlike the human HA, the swine-adapted HA demonstrated more abundant attachment to epithelial cells throughout the swine respiratory tract by virus histochemistry and increased entry into SD-PJEC swine cells. The human seasonal internal gene segments improved replication of the swine-adapted HA at 33 °C, but decreased replication at 40 °C. Although the HA was crucial for the infectivity in pigs and swine tissues, these results suggest that the adaptation of human seasonal H3 viruses to swine is multigenic and that the swine-adapted HA alone was not sufficient to confer the full phenotype of the wild-type swine-adapted virus.

Aerosolized Hydrogen Peroxide Decontamination of N95 Respirators, with Fit-Testing and Viral Inactivation, Demonstrates Feasibility for Reuse during the COVID-19 Pandemic.

In response to the demand for N95 respirators by health care workers during the COVID-19 pandemic, we evaluated decontamination of N95 respirators using an aerosolized hydrogen peroxide (aHP) system. This system is designed to dispense a consistent atomized spray of aerosolized, 7% hydrogen peroxide (H2O2) solution over a treatment cycle. Multiple N95 respirator models were subjected to 10 or more cycles of respirator decontamination, with a select number periodically assessed for qualitative and quantitative fit testing. In parallel, we assessed the ability of aHP treatment to inactivate multiple viruses absorbed onto respirators, including phi6 bacteriophage, herpes simplex virus 1 (HSV-1), coxsackievirus B3 (CVB3), and severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2). For pathogens transmitted via respiratory droplets and aerosols, it is critical to address respirator safety for reuse. This study provided experimental validation of an aHP treatment process that decontaminates the respirators while maintaining N95 function. External National Institute for Occupational Safety & Health (NIOSH) certification verified respirator structural integrity and filtration efficiency after 10 rounds of aHP treatment. Virus inactivation by aHP was comparable to the decontamination of commercial spore-based biological indicators. These data demonstrate that the aHP process is effective, with successful fit-testing of respirators after multiple aHP cycles, effective decontamination of multiple virus species, including SARS-CoV-2, successful decontamination of bacterial spores, and filtration efficiency maintained at or greater than 95%. While this study did not include extended or clinical use of N95 respirators between aHP cycles, these data provide proof of concept for aHP decontamination of N95 respirators before reuse in a crisis-capacity scenario. IMPORTANCE The COVID-19 pandemic led to unprecedented pressure on health care and research facilities to provide personal protective equipment. The respiratory nature of the SARS-CoV2 pathogen makes respirator facepieces a critical protective measure to limit inhalation of this virus. While respirator facepieces were designed for single use and disposal, the pandemic increased overall demand for N95 respirators, and corresponding manufacturing and supply chain limitations necessitated the safe reuse of respirators when necessary. In this study, we repurposed an aerosolized hydrogen peroxide (aHP) system that is regularly utilized to decontaminate materials in a biosafety level 3 (BSL3) facility, to develop a method for decontamination of N95 respirators. Results from viral inactivation, biological indicators, respirator fit testing, and filtration efficiency testing all indicated that the process was effective at rendering N95 respirators safe for reuse. This proof-of-concept study establishes baseline data for future testing of aHP in crisis-capacity respirator-reuse scenarios.

Vitamin D and the Ability to Produce 1,25(OH)2D Are Critical for Protection from Viral Infection of the Lungs.

Vitamin D supplementation is linked to improved outcomes from respiratory virus infection, and the COVID-19 pandemic renewed interest in understanding the potential role of vitamin D in protecting the lung from viral infections. Therefore, we evaluated the role of vitamin D using animal models of pandemic H1N1 influenza and severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus-2 (SARS-CoV-2) infection. In mice, dietary-induced vitamin D deficiency resulted in lung inflammation that was present prior to infection. Vitamin D sufficient (D+) and deficient (D-) wildtype (WT) and D+ and D- Cyp27B1 (Cyp) knockout (KO, cannot produce 1,25(OH)2D) mice were infected with pandemic H1N1. D- WT, D+ Cyp KO, and D- Cyp KO mice all exhibited significantly reduced survival compared to D+ WT mice. Importantly, survival was not the result of reduced viral replication, as influenza M gene expression in the lungs was similar for all animals. Based on these findings, additional experiments were performed using the mouse and hamster models of SARS-CoV-2 infection. In these studies, high dose vitamin D supplementation reduced lung inflammation in mice but not hamsters. A trend to faster weight recovery was observed in 1,25(OH)2D treated mice that survived SARS-CoV-2 infection. There was no effect of vitamin D on SARS-CoV-2 N gene expression in the lung of either mice or hamsters. Therefore, vitamin D deficiency enhanced disease severity, while vitamin D sufficiency/supplementation reduced inflammation following infections with H1N1 influenza and SARS-CoV-2.

Robustness of the Ferret Model for Influenza Risk Assessment Studies: a Cross-Laboratory Exercise.

Past pandemic influenza viruses with sustained human-to-human transmissibility have emerged from animal influenza viruses. Employment of experimental models to assess the pandemic risk of emerging zoonotic influenza viruses provides critical information supporting public health efforts. Ferret transmission experiments have been utilized to predict the human-to-human transmission potential of novel influenza viruses. However, small sample sizes and a lack of standardized protocols can introduce interlaboratory variability, complicating interpretation of transmission experimental data. To assess the range of variation in ferret transmission experiments, a global exercise was conducted by 11 laboratories using two common stock H1N1 influenza viruses with different transmission characteristics in ferrets. Parameters known to affect transmission were standardized, including the inoculation route, dose, and volume, as well as a strict 1:1 donor/contact ratio for respiratory droplet transmission. Additional host and environmental parameters likely to affect influenza transmission kinetics were monitored and analyzed. The overall transmission outcomes for both viruses across 11 laboratories were concordant, suggesting the robustness of the ferret model for zoonotic influenza risk assessment. Among environmental parameters that varied across laboratories, donor-to-contact airflow directionality was associated with increased transmissibility. To attain high confidence in identifying viruses with moderate to high transmissibility or low transmissibility under a smaller number of participating laboratories, our analyses support the notion that as few as three but as many as five laboratories, respectively, would need to independently perform viral transmission experiments with concordant results. This exercise facilitates the development of a more homogenous protocol for ferret transmission experiments that are employed for the purposes of risk assessment. IMPORTANCE Following detection of a novel virus, rapid characterization efforts (both in vitro and in vivo) are undertaken at numerous laboratories worldwide to evaluate the relative risk posed to human health. Aggregation of these data are critical, but the use of nonstandardized protocols can make interpretation of divergent results a challenge. For evaluation of virus transmissibility, a multifactorial trait which can only be evaluated in vivo, identifying intrinsic levels of variability between groups can improve the utility of these data, as well as ensure that experiments are performed with sufficient replication to ensure high confidence in compiled results. Using the ferret transmission model and two influenza A viruses, we conducted a multicenter standardization exercise to improve the interpretation of transmission data generated during risk assessment activities; this exercise serves as a model for future efforts employing both in vitro and in vivo models against possible pandemic pathogens.

Transmission and Protection against Reinfection in the Ferret Model with the SARS-CoV-2 USA-WA1/2020 Reference Isolate.

Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) has initiated a global pandemic, and several vaccines have now received emergency use authorization. Using the reference strain SARS-CoV-2 USA-WA1/2020, we evaluated modes of transmission and the ability of prior infection or vaccine-induced immunity to protect against infection in ferrets. Ferrets were semipermissive to infection with the USA-WA1/2020 isolate. When transmission was assessed via the detection of viral RNA (vRNA) at multiple time points, direct contact transmission was efficient to 3/3 and 3/4 contact animals in 2 respective studies, while respiratory droplet transmission was poor to only 1/4 contact animals. To determine if previously infected ferrets were protected against reinfection, ferrets were rechallenged 28 or 56 days postinfection. Following viral challenge, no infectious virus was recovered in nasal wash samples. In addition, levels of vRNA in the nasal wash were several orders of magnitude lower than during primary infection, and vRNA was rapidly cleared. To determine if intramuscular vaccination protected ferrets, ferrets were vaccinated using a prime-boost strategy with the S protein receptor-binding domain formulated with an oil-in-water adjuvant. Upon viral challenge, none of the mock or vaccinated animals were protected against infection, and there were no significant differences in vRNA or infectious virus titers in the nasal wash. Combined, these studies demonstrate direct contact is the predominant mode of transmission of the USA-WA1/2020 isolate in ferrets and that immunity to SARS-CoV-2 is maintained for at least 56 days. Our studies also indicate protection of the upper respiratory tract against SARS-CoV-2 will require vaccine strategies that mimic natural infection or induce site-specific immunity. IMPORTANCE The severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) USA-WA1/2020 strain is a CDC reference strain used by multiple research laboratories. Here, we show that the predominant mode of transmission of this isolate in ferrets is by direct contact. We further demonstrate ferrets are protected against reinfection for at least 56 days even when levels of neutralizing antibodies are low or undetectable. Last, we show that when ferrets were vaccinated by the intramuscular route to induce antibodies against SARS-CoV-2, ferrets remain susceptible to infection of the upper respiratory tract. Collectively, these studies suggest that protection of the upper respiratory tract will require vaccine approaches that mimic natural infection.

The Pandemic Threat of Emerging H5 and H7 Avian Influenza Viruses.

The 1918 H1N1 Spanish Influenza pandemic was the most severe pandemic in modern history. Unlike more recent pandemics, most of the 1918 H1N1 virus' genome was derived directly from an avian influenza virus. Recent avian-origin H5 A/goose/Guangdong/1/1996 (GsGd) and Asian H7N9 viruses have caused several hundred human infections with high mortality rates. While these viruses have not spread beyond infected individuals, if they evolve the ability to transmit efficiently from person-to-person, specifically via the airborne route, they will initiate a pandemic. Therefore, this review examines H5 GsGd and Asian H7N9 viruses that have caused recent zoonotic infections with a focus on viral properties that support airborne transmission. Several GsGd H5 and Asian H7N9 viruses display molecular changes that potentiate transmission and/or exhibit ability for limited transmission between ferrets. However, the hemagglutinin of these viruses is unstable; this likely represents the most significant obstacle to the emergence of a virus capable of efficient airborne transmission. Given the global disease burden of an influenza pandemic, continued surveillance and pandemic preparedness efforts against H5 GsGd and Asian lineage H7N9 viruses are warranted.

Protective efficacy of influenza group 2 hemagglutinin stem-fragment immunogen vaccines.

The stem of the influenza A virus hemagglutinin (HA) is highly conserved and represents an attractive target for a universal influenza vaccine. The 18 HA subtypes of influenza A are phylogenetically divided into two groups, and while protection with group 1 HA stem vaccines has been demonstrated in animal models, studies on group 2 stem vaccines are limited. Thus, we engineered group 2 HA stem-immunogen (SI) vaccines targeting the epitope for the broadly neutralizing monoclonal antibody CR9114 and evaluated vaccine efficacy in mice and ferrets. Immunization induced antibodies that bound to recombinant HA protein and viral particles, and competed with CR9114 for binding to the HA stem. Mice vaccinated with H3 and H7-SI were protected from lethal homologous challenge with X-79 (H3N2) or A/Anhui/1/2013 (H7N9), and displayed moderate heterologous protection. In ferrets, H7-SI vaccination did not significantly reduce weight loss or nasal wash titers after robust 107 TCID50 H7N9 virus challenge. Epitope mapping revealed ferrets developed lower titers of antibodies that bound a narrow range of HA stem epitopes compared to mice, and this likely explains the lower efficacy in ferrets. Collectively, these findings indicate that while group 2 SI vaccines show promise, their immunogenicity and efficacy are reduced in larger outbred species, and will have to be enhanced for successful translation to a universal vaccine.

In Vitro Neutralization Is Not Predictive of Prophylactic Efficacy of Broadly Neutralizing Monoclonal Antibodies CR6261 and CR9114 against Lethal H2 Influenza Virus Challenge in Mice.

Influenza viruses of the H1N1, H2N2, and H3N2 subtypes have caused previous pandemics. H2 influenza viruses represent a pandemic threat due to continued circulation in wild birds and limited immunity in the human population. In the event of a pandemic, antiviral agents are the mainstay for treatment, but broadly neutralizing antibodies (bNAbs) may be a viable alternative for short-term prophylaxis or treatment. The hemagglutinin stem binding bNAbs CR6261 and CR9114 have been shown to protect mice from severe disease following challenge with H1N1 and H5N1 and with H1N1, H3N2, and influenza B viruses, respectively. Early studies with CR6261 and CR9114 showed weak in vitro activity against human H2 influenza viruses, but the in vivo efficacy against H2 viruses is unknown. Therefore, we evaluated these antibodies against human- and animal-origin H2 viruses A/Ann Arbor/6/1960 (H2N2) (AA60) and A/swine/MO/4296424/06 (H2N3) (Sw06). In vitro, CR6261 neutralized both H2 viruses, while CR9114 only neutralized Sw06. To evaluate prophylactic efficacy, mice were given CR6261 or CR9114 and intranasally challenged 24 h later with lethal doses of AA60 or Sw06. Both antibodies reduced mortality, weight loss, airway inflammation, and pulmonary viral load. Using engineered bNAb variants, antibody-mediated cell cytotoxicity reporter assays, and Fcγ receptor-deficient (Fcer1g-/-) mice, we show that the in vivo efficacy of CR9114 against AA60 is mediated by Fcγ receptor-dependent mechanisms. Collectively, these findings demonstrate the in vivo efficacy of CR6261 and CR9114 against H2 viruses and emphasize the need for in vivo evaluation of bNAbs.IMPORTANCE bNAbs represent a strategy to prevent or treat infection by a wide range of influenza viruses. The evaluation of these antibodies against H2 viruses is important because H2 viruses caused a pandemic in 1957 and could cross into humans again. We demonstrate that CR6261 and CR9114 are effective against infection with H2 viruses of both human and animal origin in mice, despite the finding that CR9114 did not display in vitro neutralizing activity against the human H2 virus. These findings emphasize the importance of in vivo evaluation and testing of bNAbs.

Evaluation of the Biological Properties and Cross-Reactive Antibody Response to H10 Influenza Viruses in Ferrets.

The recent outbreak of avian origin H10N7 influenza among seals in northern Europe and two fatal human infections with an avian H10N8 virus in China have demonstrated that H10 viruses can spread between mammals and cause severe disease in humans. To gain insight into the potential for H10 viruses to cross the species barrier and to identify a candidate vaccine strain, we evaluated the in vitro and in vivo properties and antibody response in ferrets to 20 diverse H10 viruses. H10 virus infection of ferrets caused variable weight loss, and all 20 viruses replicated throughout the respiratory tract; however, replication in the lungs was highly variable. In glycan-binding assays, the H10 viruses preferentially bound "avian-like" α2,3-linked sialic acids. Importantly, several isolates also displayed strong binding to long-chain "human-like" α2,6-linked sialic acids and exhibited comparable or elevated neuraminidase activity relative to human H1N1, H2N2, and H3N2 viruses. In hemagglutination inhibition assays, 12 antisera cross-reacted with ≥14 of 20 H10 viruses, and 7 viruses induced neutralizing activity against ≥15 of the 20 viruses. By combining data on weight loss, viral replication, and the cross-reactive antibody response, we identified A/mallard/Portugal/79906/2009 (H10N7) as a suitable virus for vaccine development. Collectively, our findings suggest that H10 viruses may continue to sporadically infect humans and other mammals, underscoring the importance of developing an H10 vaccine for pandemic preparedness.IMPORTANCE Avian origin H10 influenza viruses sporadically infect humans and other mammals; however, little is known about viruses of this subtype. Thus, we characterized the biological properties of 20 H10 viruses in vitro and in ferrets. Infection caused mild to moderate weight loss (5 to 15%), with robust viral replication in the nasal tissues and variable replication in the lung. H10 viruses preferentially bind "avian-like" sialic acids, although several isolates also displayed binding to "human-like" sialic acid receptors. This is consistent with the ability of H10 viruses to cross the species barrier and warrants selection of an H10 vaccine strain. By evaluating the cross-reactive antibody response to the H10 viruses and combining this analysis with viral replication and weight loss findings, we identified A/mallard/Portugal/79906/2009 (H10N7) as a suitable H10 vaccine strain.

Novel Reassortant Human-Like H3N2 and H3N1 Influenza A Viruses Detected in Pigs Are Virulent and Antigenically Distinct from Swine Viruses Endemic to the United States.

UNLABELLED: Human-like swine H3 influenza A viruses (IAV) were detected by the USDA surveillance system. We characterized two novel swine human-like H3N2 and H3N1 viruses with hemagglutinin (HA) genes similar to those in human seasonal H3 strains and internal genes closely related to those of 2009 H1N1 pandemic viruses. The H3N2 neuraminidase (NA) was of the contemporary human N2 lineage, while the H3N1 NA was of the classical swine N1 lineage. Both viruses were antigenically distant from swine H3 viruses that circulate in the United States and from swine vaccine strains and also showed antigenic drift from human seasonal H3N2 viruses. Their pathogenicity and transmission in pigs were compared to those of a human H3N2 virus with a common HA ancestry. Both swine human-like H3 viruses efficiently infected pigs and were transmitted to indirect contacts, whereas the human H3N2 virus did so much less efficiently. To evaluate the role of genes from the swine isolates in their pathogenesis, reverse genetics-generated reassortants between the swine human-like H3N1 virus and the seasonal human H3N2 virus were tested in pigs. The contribution of the gene segments to virulence was complex, with the swine HA and internal genes showing effects in vivo. The experimental infections indicate that these novel H3 viruses are virulent and can sustain onward transmission in pigs, and the naturally occurring mutations in the HA were associated with antigenic divergence from H3 IAV from humans and swine. Consequently, these viruses could have a significant impact on the swine industry if they were to cause more widespread outbreaks, and the potential risk of these emerging swine IAV to humans should be considered. IMPORTANCE: Pigs are important hosts in the evolution of influenza A viruses (IAV). Human-to-swine transmissions of IAV have resulted in the circulation of reassortant viruses containing human-origin genes in pigs, greatly contributing to the diversity of IAV in swine worldwide. New human-like H3N2 and H3N1 viruses that contain a mix of human and swine gene segments were recently detected by the USDA surveillance system. The human-like viruses efficiently infected pigs and resulted in onward airborne transmission, likely due to the multiple changes identified between human and swine H3 viruses. The human-like swine viruses are distinct from contemporary U.S. H3 swine viruses and from the strains used in swine vaccines, which could have a significant impact on the swine industry due to a lack of population immunity. Additionally, public health experts should consider an appropriate assessment of the risk of these emerging swine H3 viruses for the human population.

Development of animal models against emerging coronaviruses: From SARS to MERS coronavirus.

Two novel coronaviruses have emerged to cause severe disease in humans. While bats may be the primary reservoir for both viruses, SARS coronavirus (SARS-CoV) likely crossed into humans from civets in China, and MERS coronavirus (MERS-CoV) has been transmitted from camels in the Middle East. Unlike SARS-CoV that resolved within a year, continued introductions of MERS-CoV present an on-going public health threat. Animal models are needed to evaluate countermeasures against emerging viruses. With SARS-CoV, several animal species were permissive to infection. In contrast, most laboratory animals are refractory or only semi-permissive to infection with MERS-CoV. This host-range restriction is largely determined by sequence heterogeneity in the MERS-CoV receptor. We describe animal models developed to study coronaviruses, with a focus on host-range restriction at the level of the viral receptor and discuss approaches to consider in developing a model to evaluate countermeasures against MERS-CoV.

Genome rearrangement of influenza virus for anti-viral drug screening.

Rearrangement of the influenza A genome such that NS2 is expressed downstream of PB1 permits the insertion of a foreign gene in the NS gene segment. In this report, the genome rearranged strategy was extended to A/California/04/2009 (pH1N1), and Gaussia luciferase (GLuc) or GFP was expressed downstream of the full-length NS1 gene (designated GLucCa04 and GFPCa04, respectively). In growth kinetics studies, culture of amantadine sensitive GLucCa04 (Sens/GlucCa04) in the presence of amantadine significantly decreased GLuc expression and viral titers for 48 h post-infection (hpi). When Sens/GlucCa04 was subsequently used in an in vitro anti-viral screening assay, amantadine treatment significantly decreased GLuc expression from amantadine sensitive compared to amantadine resistant GLucCa04 (Res/GlucCa04) as early as 16 hpi. In in vivo screening studies, DBA mice were treated daily with amantadine from 1 day prior to infection and inoculated with either Sens/GlucCa04 or Res/GlucCa04 alone or as a co-infection with the parental strain. On days 3 and 5 post-infection, lung samples were collected and amantadine treatment was shown to decrease GLuc expression by two orders of magnitude (p<0.05) in Sens/GlucCa04 infected mice. Furthermore, while both Sens and Res/GlucCa04 were highly attenuated, addition of the parental strain to the inoculum yielded clinical disease indicative of GLuc expression and pulmonary viral titers. These findings indicate that the use of GLucCa04 can potentially accelerate in vitro and in vivo anti-viral screening by shortening the time required for virus detection.

Airborne transmission of highly pathogenic H7N1 influenza virus in ferrets.

UNLABELLED: Avian H7 influenza viruses are recognized as potential pandemic viruses, as personnel often become infected during poultry outbreaks. H7 infections in humans typically cause mild conjunctivitis; however, the H7N9 outbreak in the spring of 2013 has resulted in severe respiratory disease. To date, no H7 viruses have acquired the ability for sustained transmission among humans. Airborne transmission is considered a requirement for the emergence of pandemic influenza, and advanced knowledge of the molecular changes or signature required for transmission would allow early identification of pandemic vaccine seed stocks, screening and stockpiling of antiviral compounds, and eradication efforts focused on flocks harboring threatening viruses. Thus, we sought to determine if a highly pathogenic influenza A H7N1 (A/H7N1) virus with no history of human infection could become capable of airborne transmission among ferrets. We show that after 10 serial passages, A/H7N1 developed the ability to be transmitted to cohoused and airborne contact ferrets. Four amino acid mutations (PB2 T81I, NP V284M, and M1 R95K and Q211K) in the internal genes and a minimal amino acid mutation (K/R313R) in the stalk region of the hemagglutinin protein were associated with airborne transmission. Furthermore, transmission was not associated with loss of virulence. These findings highlight the importance of the internal genes in host adaptation and suggest that natural isolates carrying these mutations be further evaluated. Our results demonstrate that a highly pathogenic avian H7 virus can become capable of airborne transmission in a mammalian host, and they support ongoing surveillance and pandemic H7 vaccine development. IMPORTANCE: The major findings of this report are that a highly pathogenic strain of H7N1 avian influenza virus can be adapted to become capable of airborne transmission in mammals without mutations altering receptor specificity. Changes in receptor specificity have been shown to play a role in the ability of avian influenza viruses to cross the species barrier, and these changes are assumed to be essential. The work reported here challenges this paradigm, at least for the influenza viruses of the H7 subtype, which have recently become the focus of major attention, as they have crossed to humans.

Alternative reassortment events leading to transmissible H9N1 influenza viruses in the ferret model.

Influenza A H9N2 viruses are common poultry pathogens that occasionally infect swine and humans. It has been shown previously with H9N2 viruses that reassortment can generate novel viruses with increased transmissibility. Here, we demonstrate the modeling power of a novel transfection-based inoculation system to select reassortant viruses under in vivo selective pressure. Plasmids containing the genes from an H9N2 virus and a pandemic H1N1 (pH1N1) virus were transfected into HEK 293T cells to potentially generate the full panel of possible H9 reassortants. These cells were then used to inoculate ferrets, and the population dynamics were studied. Two respiratory-droplet-transmissible H9N1 viruses were selected by this method, indicating a selective pressure in ferrets for the novel combination of surface genes. These results show that a transfection-based inoculation system is a fast and efficient method to model reassortment and highlight the risk of reassortment between H9N2 and pH1N1 viruses.

Receptor characterization and susceptibility of cotton rats to avian and 2009 pandemic influenza virus strains.

Animal influenza viruses (AIVs) are a major threat to human health and the source of pandemic influenza. A reliable small-mammal model to study the pathogenesis of infection and for testing vaccines and therapeutics against multiple strains of influenza virus is highly desirable. We show that cotton rats (Sigmodon hispidus) are susceptible to avian and swine influenza viruses. Cotton rats express α2,3-linked sialic acid (SA) and α2,6-linked SA residues in the trachea and α2,6-linked SA residues in the lung parenchyma. Prototypic avian influenza viruses (H3N2, H9N2, and H5N1) and swine-origin 2009 pandemic H1N1 viruses replicated in the nose and in the respiratory tract of cotton rats without prior adaptation and produced strong lung pathology that was characterized by early lung neutrophilia, followed by subsequent pneumonia. Consistent with other natural and animal models of influenza, only the H5N1 virus was lethal for cotton rats. More importantly, we show that the different avian and pandemic H1N1 strains tested are strong activators of the type I interferon (IFN)-inducible MX-1 gene both locally and systemically. Our data indicate that the cotton rat is a suitable small-mammal model to study the infection of animal influenza viruses and for validation of vaccines and therapeutics against these viruses.

Improved hatchability and efficient protection after in ovo vaccination with live-attenuated H7N2 and H9N2 avian influenza viruses.

Mass in ovo vaccination with live attenuated viruses is widely used in the poultry industry to protect against various infectious diseases. The worldwide outbreaks of low pathogenic and highly pathogenic avian influenza highlight the pressing need for the development of similar mass vaccination strategies against avian influenza viruses. We have previously shown that a genetically modified live attenuated avian influenza virus (LAIV) was amenable for in ovo vaccination and provided optimal protection against H5 HPAI viruses. However, in ovo vaccination against other subtypes resulted in poor hatchability and, therefore, seemed impractical. In this study, we modified the H7 and H9 hemagglutinin (HA) proteins by substituting the amino acids at the cleavage site for those found in the H6 HA subtype. We found that with this modification, a single dose in ovo vaccination of 18-day old eggs provided complete protection against homologous challenge with low pathogenic virus in ≥ 70% of chickens at 2 or 6 weeks post-hatching. Further, inoculation of 19-day old egg embryos with 106 EID50 of LAIVs improved hatchability to ≥ 90% (equivalent to unvaccinated controls) with similar levels of protection. Our findings indicate that the strategy of modifying the HA cleavage site combined with the LAIV backbone could be used for in ovo vaccination against avian influenza. Importantly, with protection conferred as early as 2 weeks post-hatching, with this strategy birds would be protected prior to or at the time of delivery to a farm or commercial operation.

The effect of grafted methoxypoly(ethylene glycol) chain length on the inhibition of respiratory syncytial virus (RSV) infection and proliferation.

Respiratory syncytial virus (RSV) is a significant cause of morbidity in humans. To date, no effective treatments exist and current prophylactic therapy access is limited and is only approximately 50% effective. To attenuate the risk of RSV infection, we hypothesized that bioengineering of either the virus particle or host cell via the covalent grafting of methoxypoly(ethylene glycol) [mPEG] would prevent infection. To this end, the anti-viral effects of grafting concentration, linker chemistry and polymer length on RSV infection was assessed. For viral modification, short chain polymers (2 kDa) were significantly more effective than long chain (20 kDa) polymers. In contrast, modification of host cells with small polymers provided no (approximately 0%) protection while long chain polymers effectively prevented infection. For example, at 48 hours post-infection at a multiplicity of infection of 0.5 and grafting concentrations of 5, 7.5, and 15 mm, 20 kDa mPEG decreased infection by 45, 83, and 91%, respectively. Importantly, both viral and host cell PEGylation strategies were able to provide near complete protection against RSV infection of both non-polarized and polarized cells. In conclusion, mPEG-modification of either RSV or the host cell is a highly effective prophylactic strategy for preventing viral infection.